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Today’s national-security state is increasingly highly concentrated, central-
ized, and consolidated across at least three dimensions: the public-private divide, 
the federal-state divide, and the political–civil servant divide within government 
agencies. Each of these dimensions of concentration, centralization, and consolida-
tion has been individually examined. Yet notwithstanding careful study, there has 
been little appreciation of the potentially reinforcing effects of consolidation occur-
ring along any two, let alone all three, of the relevant dimensions. That is to say, 
scholars and policymakers have generally zeroed in on only one dimension of con-
solidation at a time—and they have assessed the pros and cons of public-private, 
federal-state, or intra-agency consolidation against what they treat as an otherwise 
static backdrop. 
This Essay insists that we need to think more capaciously and systemically—
to take stock of all of the moving parts and gauge how they work together. We need 
to do so for purposes of smarter, more careful institutional design that accounts for 
the multiple dimensions on which federal executive power has become concentrated 
and consolidated. What’s more, we need to do so for reasons pertaining to constitu-
tional separation of powers. The public-private, federal-state, and intra-agency 
lines of separation are each constitutionally salient. Even if the weakening or col-
lapsing of any one of those lines of separation does not by itself rise to the level of a 
constitutional transgression, the weakening or collapsing of multiple lines of sepa-
ration within a given substantive policy domain may well threaten our constitu-
tional order. In short, this Essay proffers a multidimensional, aggregate-effects 
theory of constitutional structure. The sum total of individually minor incursions 
(on private, state, and bureaucratic autonomy) might constitute a major one as the 
president and her agency heads accumulate power along multiple dimensions, 
picking up bits and pieces from dragooned corporations, from co-opted states and 
municipalities, and from a defanged federal workforce effectively serving at the 
pleasure of the Administration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s national-security state is increasingly highly con-
centrated, centralized, and consolidated. It is so across at least 
three dimensions. 
First, power across spheres is commingled and consolidated, 
with the government contracting with, partnering with, deputiz-
ing, and otherwise directing private firms and individuals to ad-
vance military, intelligence, and homeland security objectives.1 
Second, power across jurisdictions is consolidated, with one au-
thority (usually the feds) dragooning, directing, and encouraging 
other authorities (usually state and local agencies) to support 
counterterrorism and emergency-management initiatives.2 And 
third, power within any one government agency is consolidated, 
with agency leaders asserting greater control over a good num-
ber of their department’s rank-and-file employees (who previous-
ly had been legally insulated from political pressure exerted by 
those agency leaders).3  
Each of these lines of concentration, centralization, and con-
solidation has been individually examined.4 And there is no 
shortage of corresponding analysis of how centralization or con-
solidation along any one of these dimensions has (or is likely to) 
 
 1 See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of 
Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It (Cambridge 
2007) (addressing national-security privatization); Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Home-
land Security, 88 Tex L Rev 1435 (2010) (detailing homeland security public-private part-
nerships); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partner-
ships in the War on Terror, 96 Cal L Rev 901 (2008) (examining intelligence public-private 
partnerships); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts 
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 BC L Rev 989 (2005) (de-
scribing military contracting); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: 
Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 Stan L & Pol 
Rev 549 (2005) (same). 
 2 See, for example, Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: The 
Domestic Use of the Military and the Power of the Several States, 5 Harv Natl Sec J 537, 
633–35 (2014) (describing the coordination of federal and state resources for domestic 
emergency-management operations); Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federal-
ism in the Age of Terror, 64 Stan L Rev 289, 301–11 (2012) (detailing federal-state-local 
intelligence partnerships); Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, Network Account-
ability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 Hastings L J 1441, 1448–55 (2011) 
(same); Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)terrorism, 88 Tex L Rev 
1715, 1717–24 (2010) (describing federal-local cooperation in counterterrorism efforts). 
 3 See generally Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 
Colum L Rev 515 (2015); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 Georgetown L J 
1023 (2013). 
 4 See notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
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advance or complicate national-security operations.5 Yet not-
withstanding careful study, there has been little appreciation of 
the potentially reinforcing effects of consolidation occurring 
along any two, let alone all three, of the dimensions mentioned 
above. That is to say, scholars, policymakers, and journalists have 
generally zeroed in on only one dimension of consolidation at a 
time and assessed the pros and cons of public-private, federal-
state, or intra-agency consolidation against what they treat as an 
otherwise static backdrop. 
This Essay insists that we need to think more capaciously 
and systemically—to take stock of all of the moving parts and 
gauge how they work together. We need to do so for purposes of 
smarter, more careful institutional design that accounts for the 
multiple dimensions on which federal executive power has be-
come concentrated, centralized, and consolidated. What’s more, 
we need to do so for reasons pertaining to constitutional separa-
tion of powers. The public-private, federal-state, and intra-
agency lines of separation are each constitutionally salient. 
Even if the blurring or collapsing of any single line of separation 
(public-private, federal-state, or presidential appointee–civil 
servant) does not by itself rise to the level of a constitutional 
transgression, the collapsing of multiple lines of separation 
within a given substantive policy domain may well threaten our 
constitutional order. In short, this Essay proffers a multidimen-
sional, aggregate-effects theory of constitutional structure. The 
sum total of individually minor incursions (on private, state, 
and bureaucratic autonomy) may constitute a major incursion6 
as the president and her agency heads accumulate power along 
multiple dimensions, picking up bits and pieces from dra-
gooned corporations, co-opted states and municipalities, and a 
defanged federal workforce effectively serving at the pleasure 
of the Administration. 
I.  THE SYSTEMIC AND REINFORCING EFFECTS OF 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATIONAL-SECURITY CONSOLIDATION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SMART INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The push to concentrate and consolidate governmental pow-
er—and national-security power in particular—has been quite 
 
 5 See Part I.A. 
 6 For a seminal work on aggregate effects in various legal domains, see generally 
Ariel Porat and Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 Yale L J 2 (2012).  
 202  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:199 
   
strong in recent years, intensifying most notably in the after-
math of 9/11.7 It is well beyond the scope of this Essay to recount 
the many discrete instances of such consolidation. Fortunately, 
the trend is not an unfamiliar one—nor is it one whose existence 
is subject to much dispute. 
Accordingly, I begin my inquiry in medias res, as it were, 
stipulating that much concentration has occurred and that it has 
occurred along multiple dimensions, including (but not limited 
to)8 the ones mentioned in the Introduction. Building on those 
stipulations, Part I.A summarizes the principal arguments in 
favor of and against public-private, federal-state, and intra-
agency consolidation as a matter of smart institutional design. 
Part I.B suggests that the debate over consolidation is limited or 
incomplete, in large part because participants in that debate 
typically focus on singular, discrete consolidating efforts along 
only one dimension. Given that the concentration of governmen-
tal power is occurring along multiple dimensions, often at the 
same time, it is my contention that those interested in institu-
tional design need to more fully appreciate the ways in which 
the multiple lines of concentration can—and seemingly do—
interact with one another. Indeed, multidimensional consolida-
tion is likely to amplify the advantages, or multiply the dangers, 
that are associated with greater concentration of State responsi-
bilities along any one dimension. 
 
 7 See notes 1–3, 8, and accompanying text. See also Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub L No 107-296, 116 Stat 2135; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004, Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638. 
 8 There are, in addition, important forms of centralization or consolidation occur-
ring across national borders and between and among federal agencies. For an example of 
transnational consolidation, see Austin Long, Partners or Proxies? U.S. and Host Nation 
Cooperation in Counterterrorism Operations (Combating Terrorism Center, Nov 30, 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Q9FD-BZL6. For examples of interagency consolida-
tion, see Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 Colum L Rev 211, 221–34, 243–49 (2015); 
Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
Harv L Rev 1131, 1155–73 (2012); Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, and 
Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of 
Legal Mandates, 59 Stan L Rev 673, 704–12 (2006). See also William C. Banks, And the 
Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance after the Terror, 57 U Miami L Rev 
1147, 1164–67 (2003) (noting the breakdown of the “wall” previously understood to sepa-
rate law-enforcement from intelligence-surveillance operations). 
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A. The Practical Virtues and Problems with Consolidation 
along Any Single Dimension 
Generally speaking, proponents of greater consolidation of 
national-security responsibilities emphasize that State power 
can be wielded more effectively and with far greater accountabil-
ity when that power is indeed consolidated. Consolidation across 
any of the lines of separation or division identified above helps 
amalgamate otherwise disaggregated and often rivalrous power 
centers, enabling government officials to more fully marshal, co-
ordinate, and direct resources to address the task at hand. At 
the same time, consolidation aims to reduce or eliminate various 
points of drag, resistance, confusion, and competition (stemming 
from what proponents of consolidation see as petty turf wars). 
In what follows, I describe the purported virtues of consoli-
dation along each of the following dimensions: public-private, 
federal-state, and intra-agency. I then recount some of the main 
arguments against efforts to concentrate State power. 
1. Public-private. 
Over the past couple of decades, government reliance on 
public-private partnerships has skyrocketed. Such partnerships, 
whether reached contractually or through less formal mecha-
nisms,9 are ubiquitous across the range of government responsi-
bilities.10 But they are especially prominent in the realm of na-
tional security, where military, intelligence, and homeland 
security operations are regularly carried out by or with the help 
of private actors.11 
Those championing this fusion of public and private power 
generally seek to expand, extend, and improve the efficacy of 
government programs. Briefly, private actors can furnish the 
State with additional manpower. Such force-multiplying effects 
were certainly on display in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the 
 
 9 See, for example, Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Production of National Security, 98 
Cornell L Rev 637, 683–85 (2013) (describing a range of public-private partnerships); 
Michaels, 88 Tex L Rev at 1156–57 (cited in note 1); Michaels, 96 Cal L Rev at 904 (cited 
in note 1). 
 10 See generally Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals: Privatization and the Public 
Good (Beacon 2002) (discussing public-private partnerships in education, criminal jus-
tice, legal services, and welfare programs). See also David A. Super, Privatization, Policy 
Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 Cal L Rev 393, 405–07 (2008) (describing the privatization of 
several signature welfare programs). 
 11 See note 1 and accompanying text. 
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number of private military contractors often matched and at 
times exceeded the number of active duty American servicemen 
and women.12 Private actors can also provide government offi-
cials with special access to otherwise unavailable or hard-to-
penetrate financial, travel, and social media databases, physical 
locations, and telecommunications networks.13 Lastly, these pri-
vate actors can sometimes carry out tasks that government offi-
cials are themselves prohibited by law from undertaking.14 
Proponents of public-private partnerships contend that 
without the benefit of such ongoing and dedicated arrange-
ments, the government would be limited in its knowledge and 
reach. That is, government officials would be forced to make do 
with less15 or otherwise try to extend the State’s reach through 
more adversarial means such as military conscription, subpoe-
nas, and court orders. With a steady and ready set of private ac-
tors trained16 (and often paid17) to support and expand various 
government efforts—and a sense of a shared enterprise that on-
going and tight-knit partnerships seemingly engender18—the 
costs of gaining private sector assistance and the likelihood of 
private resistance are reduced dramatically. 
 
 12 Moshe Schwartz, Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
Background and Analysis *13 (Congressional Research Service, Aug 13, 2009), archived 
at http://perma.cc/XH95-QMMF. 
 13 See Michaels, 88 Tex L Rev at 1435–41 (cited in note 1). 
 14 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U Chi L Rev 717, 734–
39 (2010). 
 15 See Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and 
Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 Wash U L Q 1001, 1062–64 (2004) (suggest-
ing that absent the availability of contractors, the US government would be forced to 
scale back its military engagement, initiate a civilian draft, or rely more heavily on mul-
tinational cooperation). 
 16 See Michaels, 88 Tex L Rev at 1444–46 (cited in note 1) (describing the range of 
government-sponsored training programs for private actors deemed potentially useful in 
advancing or supporting counterterrorism initiatives). 
 17 Some of that compensation is indirect. See Michaels, 96 Cal L Rev at 913 (cited 
in note 1) (considering the influence that large and lucrative government contracts unre-
lated to specific counterterrorism operations have on the willingness of telecom firms to 
support those counterterrorism operations). 
 18 See Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion’s Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records *20–50 
(DOJ, Jan 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/EZ7R-9L4U (describing the camaraderie be-
tween telecom and government officials involved in surveillance partnerships, highlighting 
the apparent enthusiasm telecom employees expressed as part of “TEAM USA,” and docu-
menting those private employees’ efforts to help the government cut legal corners). 
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2. Federal-state. 
National-security operations are also becoming increasingly 
vertically integrated. Generally, it is federal officials who take 
the lead and direct their state and local counterparts—but the 
converse happens as well.19 Consider, among other things, the 
consolidation of federal, state, and local intelligence gathering 
and analysis as prescribed by the Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act of 2004,20 the proliferation of joint terror-
ism task forces,21 and the development of a national network of 
fusion centers.22 
Supporters of such vertical consolidation recognize that fed-
eral, state, and local officials all have distinct strengths and 
weaknesses, and thus that there is considerable value in bring-
ing those officials together. Moreover, were federal, state, and 
local officials acting more independently of one another, they’d 
likely be bumping into each other, unwittingly duplicating each 
other’s work, or even jeopardizing each other’s missions. The ex-
istence of fragile, broken, thin, or simply confused lines of con-
trol and communication thus threatens the efficiency and effica-
cy of any number of efforts. For these reasons, many have hailed 
federal-state-local coordination and centralization, emphasizing 
their particular importance in national-security contexts where 
speed, comprehensiveness, and a clearly defined chain of com-
mand are often understood to be essential when it comes to 
identifying and neutralizing threats.23 
 
 19 See Waxman, 64 Stan L Rev at 314–18 (cited in note 2) (describing state and lo-
cally led initiatives that involved partnering with the federal government). 
 20 Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638. 
 21 See Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(FBI), archived at http://perma.cc/PA49-6TWR (stating that 71 of the 104 joint terrorism 
task forces were created after 9/11); Rascoff, 88 Tex L Rev at 1742 (cited in note 2) (em-
phasizing federal dominance over most joint task forces). 
 22 For a comprehensive overview of the fusion center program, see State and Major 
Urban Area Fusion Centers (DHS, July 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A8ZH-KPFG. 
 23 See, for example, Waxman, 64 Stan L Rev at 292 (cited in note 2) (emphasizing 
the importance of “harnessing state and local institutions for national security”); John 
Ashcroft, Cooperation with State and Local Officials in the Fight against Terrorism *1 
(Office of the Attorney General, Nov 13, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/5WZ8-ZR5A 
(stressing that “law enforcement officials at all levels of government—federal, state, and 
local—must work together, sharing information and resources needed” to deter and pun-
ish terrorists); National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States 215–41, 390, 401, 416 (Norton 2004) (underscoring the im-
portance of vertical integration of American intelligence capabilities). 
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3. Intra-agency. 
A third and related pattern involves the consolidation of 
national-security power within any one government agency. 
Those clamoring for a more effective, fully mobilized, and fully 
accountable government worry about the tensions and lines of 
division that typically exist within most agencies. Specifically, 
they worry about the rivalry (or simply the disconnect) between 
top agency officials—appointed by the president and serving at 
her pleasure—and the politically independent, job-tenured, ca-
reer civil servants24 often alleged to be apathetic25 or hostile to 
the interests and objectives of the presidentially appointed lead-
ership.26 A more unitary expression of agency power (achieved by 
truly subordinating career staff to the agency leaders) would, 
they insist, streamline agencies and render them more political-
ly responsive and accountable.27  
Those seeking such intra-agency consolidation have been 
quite successful. Over the past decade or so, hundreds of thou-
sands of civil servants at the federal, state, and local levels have 
been reclassified as at-will employees who now serve at the 
pleasure of the agency leaders,28 with seemingly further reclassi-
fications to come.29 
 
 24 See Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 538–47 (cited in note 3) (describing the rival-
rous engagement between agency leaders and rank-and-file civil servants). 
 25 See, for example, E.S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government 4–6, 
119–230 (Chatham House 1987); Kevin R. Kosar, Privatization and the Federal Govern-
ment: An Introduction *4–5 (Congressional Research Service, Dec 28, 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2UNW-Q2KF; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L 
Rev 2245, 2263 (2001) (describing bureaucratic “torpor”). 
 26 See, for example, Daniel Guttman and Barry Willner, The Shadow Government: 
The Government’s Multi-billion-Dollar Giveaway of Its Decision-Making Powers to Pri-
vate Management Consultants, “Experts,” and Think Tanks 28, 65, 151 (Pantheon 1976) 
(characterizing political appointees’ frustration with a civil service viewed as hostile to 
the president’s agenda); Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 572–73 (cited in note 3); Peter L. 
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573, 586 (1984) (recognizing that the civil service’s “coopera-
tion must be won to achieve any desired outcome”). 
 27   This is presumably especially true in an era in which agency leaders are them-
selves highly politicized. See, for example, David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: 
Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo Wash L Rev 
1095, 1121–29 (2008); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “the Decider”? The President in Ad-
ministrative Law, 75 Geo Wash L Rev 696, 707–08 (2007). 
 28 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2333 (2006) (documenting the recent 
weakening of civil service protections for approximately 170,000 federal employees); 
Michaels, 101 Georgetown L J at 1047–50 (cited in note 3) (identifying and describing 
the “marketization of the bureaucracy” in which federal, state, county, and municipal 
civil servants are being reclassified as at-will employees); Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 
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* * * 
So far I have focused only on the purported advantages of 
concentrating power. There are many who contest the benefits of 
institutional consolidation in general and along each of these 
three dimensions in particular. Some critics might even agree 
with the goals of consolidation but remain dubious that the in-
stitutional redesigns or dedicated partnerships of the sort de-
scribed above will produce the intended results. That is to say, 
they’re skeptical that consolidation engenders the desired efficien-
cies or achieves the desired degree of institutional and organiza-
tional uniformity, homogeneity, and hierarchical accountability. 
Others might be willing to concede that consolidation across 
the public-private, federal-state, and intra-agency divides 
achieves what it seeks to accomplish but nevertheless insist that 
those aims are deleterious. This latter group of critics would be 
one that affirmatively prizes a nonconsolidated space, where 
power is purposefully and importantly divided to limit govern-
ment overreaching; where redundancies constitute a different, 
and better, method of ensuring nothing of consequence falls 
through the cracks; and where the separation of authority and re-
sponsibility between, among, or even within institutions amplifies 
a diverse set of viewpoints and promotes healthy competition 
(such that there is incentive to find and root out problems and to 
challenge questionable strategic, tactical, or legal decisions).30 
 
584 (cited in note 3). See also Paul R. Verkuil, Deprofessionalizing State Governments: 
The Rise of Public At-Will Employment, 75 Pub Admin Rev 188, 188 (2015) (discussing 
the marketization of the bureaucracy at the state level). 
 29 See Office of Personnel Management and Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence, Designation of National Security Positions in the Competitive Service, and Re-
lated Matters, 78 Fed Reg 31847, 31850–51 (2013) (allowing White House officials to re-
classify current federal civil servants whose work responsibilities touch on national or 
homeland security as at-will employees). 
 It bears mentioning that the Pentagon presents a distinctive case given it has both a 
political–civil service line of separation as well as a military-civilian divide. Of late, at-
tention has been given to the increasing politicization of the military leadership. See 
Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 43–64 (Belknap 2010). 
Whether that politicization trend reflects a military-civilian consolidation similar to the 
forms of consolidation discussed in this Essay or, instead, a troubling inversion of the 
traditional and constitutionally resonant model of civilian control is beyond the scope of 
this Essay. 
 30 See, for example, Cohen, Cuéllar, and Weingast, 59 Stan L Rev at 711 (cited in note 
8); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Oversee-
ing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal L Rev 1655, 1676–78 (2006) (questioning the 
wisdom of interagency consolidation because such consolidation enables groupthink and lim-
its creativity); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in 
the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 Brooklyn L Rev 1277, 1290–91 (2004) (emphasizing the 
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B. The Reinforcing Effects of Consolidation Occurring along 
Two or More Dimensions 
What I’ve just presented is a stylized, simplified account of 
powerful and often far more nuanced claims. In doing so, I was 
not covering much new ground, nor trying to; nor was I endors-
ing or challenging those claims on the merits. Instead, I am tak-
ing it as a given that consolidation achieves its desired effects 
and am doing so to tee up what’s seemingly missing from de-
bates and conversations about consolidation. Rarely have schol-
ars and policymakers focused their attention on multiple lines of 
institutional concentration happening in any one substantive 
policy domain. Rarely too have they considered the aggregate ef-
fects of minimizing opportunities for rivalrous pushback and au-
tonomous activity across multiple dimensions. This is so not-
withstanding the fact that the military, intelligence, homeland 
security, and emergency-management domains have each re-
cently become more fully consolidated along all three of the di-
mensions this Essay highlights. 
It isn’t altogether obvious why such integrative thinking 
hasn’t more fully informed contemporary inquiries. A couple of 
reasons do, however, come to mind. First, many practices and in-
itiatives that result in consolidated State power are incremental, 
subterranean, or piecemeal. As such, perhaps observers zero in 
on the instant, marginal, or readily observable reconfiguration 
of State power, focusing on that change to the exclusion of other, 
less transparent consolidating efforts along other dimensions. 
Second, different structural dimensions are more or less im-
portant to different groups of scholars. Perhaps scholars attend 
to the particular dimensions that they study—for example, fed-
eralism or privatization—while downplaying the other axes of 
consolidation. 
For these reasons among, no doubt, others, there is an appar-
ent need for more sweeping studies that would help show how the 
multiple dimensions of consolidation seemingly interact with one 
another as related parts in a system.31 To be sure, in some con-
texts the addition of a second or third dimension of consolidation 
 
virtues of state autonomy vis-à-vis federal control); Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 552–
70 (cited in note 3) (explaining the problems that result from fusing public and private 
power); Jon D. Michaels, Book Review, Running Government Like a Business . . . Then 
and Now, 128 Harv L Rev 1152, 1168–70 (2015) (criticizing efforts to weaken intra-
agency rivalries). 
 31 See Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution 3–5 (Oxford 2011). 
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might have only a marginal impact above and beyond what the 
initial dimension achieved in terms of, among other things, in-
creased operational efficiencies. 
In other contexts, those second or third dimensions of con-
solidation might double or triple the efficiencies. For instance, 
considerable federal-state consolidation in addition to extensive 
public-private cooperation provides federal officials with two ex-
tra sets of resources to supplement their preexisting tools and 
authorities. 
And in yet still other contexts, the effect of multiple layers 
of consolidation might be exponential. Consider the possibility 
that there already exist surveillance partnerships between the 
private sector and state governments. If federal surveillance op-
erations are restructured to more fully integrate state and pri-
vate resources, federal officials will be getting more than just 
the benefits of two new and distinct sets of resources. These fed-
eral officials will also be acquiring the productive, synergistic 
capacity of two distinct sets of resources that already know how 
to work well together.32  
Lastly, there might be some effects that are entirely novel—
that is, the combined effects of multidimensional consolidation 
produce results that no one line of consolidation could generate 
by itself.33 For example, a new and untested Department of 
Homeland Security fortified through public-private, federal-
state, and intra-agency consolidation might be a more formida-
ble counterweight to the venerable and long-potent Department 
of Justice in ways that—for better or worse—actually limit the 
aggregate exercise of federal executive power.34 In such a case, 
multidimensional consolidation in one domain (that of homeland 
security) might actually result in a greater disaggregation of 
power across domains (that is, between federal agencies).  
 
 32 See Citron and Pasquale, 62 Hastings L J at 1449–55 (cited in note 2). 
 33 Vermeule, The System of the Constitution at 4–5 (cited in note 31). 
 34 There is a rich literature on multiagency administrative collaboration and com-
petition. See generally, for example, Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 Admin 
L Rev 181 (2011); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Ad-
ministrative Law, 2006 S Ct Rev 201; O’Connell, 94 Cal L Rev 1655 (cited in note 30). 
For discussions of interagency rivalries in national-security contexts, see generally Jon 
D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Securi-
ty Domains and Beyond, 97 Va L Rev 801 (2011). 
 210  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:199 
   
* * * 
Given the number of federal agencies, state and local offi-
cials, and private parties involved in the development and ad-
ministration of our national-security responsibilities, it is be-
yond the scope of this project to actually evaluate the reinforcing 
(or counterbalancing) effects of multidimensional consolidation 
on the ground. Thus, this Part of the Essay has necessarily op-
erated at a level of abstraction, highlighting the risks of suc-
cumbing to the fallacy of systems vis-à-vis national-security con-
solidation, suggesting a framework for thinking holistically 
about organizational and structural reform initiatives, and invit-
ing more finely calibrated assessments of existing and proposed 
forms of consolidated State power. 
II.  THE SYSTEMIC AND REINFORCING EFFECTS OF 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATIONAL-SECURITY CONSOLIDATION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
The streamlining and consolidating taking place have reso-
nance beyond pure questions of institutional design and prac-
tice. After all, these aren’t just any old lines being collapsed or 
blurred. Rather, consolidation is occurring along some of the 
most constitutionally salient fault lines. The separating and 
checking of federal power is a cornerstone of our constitutional 
scheme, as famously evidenced by its tripartite horizontal divi-
sion among a legislative, executive, and judicial branch and by 
its vertical structure that safeguards state prerogatives. Not-
withstanding the central emphasis on tripartitism and federal-
ism, the constitutional commitment to separation runs deeper 
still.35 Consider, for example, the Constitution’s implicit delinea-
tion and protection of a distinct and autonomous private 
sphere.36 Consider too the importance of intra-agency or admin-
istrative separation of powers (which, as I’ve argued elsewhere, 
 
 35 See Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An 
Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 NYU L Rev *1, 7–15 (forthcoming 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/TT75-LS8G; Young, 69 Brooklyn L Rev at 1289 (cited 
in note 30) (characterizing buy-in from multiple, diverse actors as a “pervasive institu-
tional strategy in the Constitution” that includes, but extends beyond, the constitutional 
separation of powers). 
 36 Many of the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights limit the reach of the State 
and thus preserve private autonomy. See, for example, US Const Amends I–IV, IX–X. 
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merits constitutional solicitude once federal power is regularly 
routed through administrative agencies).37 
This Part examines the potentially reinforcing effects of mul-
tidimensional institutional and organizational consolidation 
through a constitutional lens. My claim here is the following: even 
assuming that it is far from clear that any singular, unidimen-
sional consolidating initiative or practice discussed in this Essay is 
by itself constitutionally verboten (that is, no hard public-private, 
federal-state, or intra-agency boundary has been transgressed), 
the total effect of consolidation across multiple dimensions might 
represent, in the aggregate, too much of an aggrandizement of 
federal executive power.38 As will be discussed in Part II.B, an 
aggregate-effects approach to constitutional analysis can help us 
determine whether multidimensional consolidation has, in ef-
fect, gone too far. 
A. The Constitutional Resonance of Separating and Checking 
Federal Power 
In this Section, I highlight the constitutional significance of 
the various lines of division central to this inquiry: the public-
private, federal-state, and intra-agency divides. Again, because 
this is a symposium essay, I paint in broad and quick strokes. 
1. Public-private. 
First, the public-private divide is arguably the most histori-
cally significant and universally recognized of all the divisions—
marking the State as different from the private sphere even in 
unitary liberal governing systems that, unlike ours, do not fea-
ture horizontal separation of powers or a federalist structure.39 
This public-private line of separation protects private autonomy; 
limits the power and reach of the State; promotes a healthy divi-
sion of labor and responsibility; and ensures that when coercive 
force is exercised, it is exercised by democratically accountable 
and legitimate officials.40 
 
 37 See Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 529–31 (cited in note 3). 
 38 See Porat and Posner, 122 Yale L J at 55–57 (cited in note 6) (describing the le-
gal salience of aggregating strategies). 
 39 See, for example, Paul Starr, Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism 53–
58 (Basic Books 2007). 
 40 See Michaels, Book Review, 128 Harv L Rev at 1163–70 (cited in note 30) (em-
phasizing the State’s “specialness” in terms of its structural commitments to democratic 
deliberation and reason giving); Department of Transportation v Association of American 
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The public-private divide in the United States is, of course, 
hardly impenetrable.41 But that divide cannot42 and ought not be 
altogether trampled over. Whereas an independent private sec-
tor can serve as a vigorous check on State power, a deputized or 
co-opted private sector is anything but such a bulwark. Instead, 
such commingled government and private power very much en-
ables the State (specifically, quite often, the federal executive) to 
reach more broadly and deeply—and correspondingly limits pri-
vate capacity to resist arbitrary or abusive exercises of State 
power.43 
2. Federal-state. 
Second, the maintenance of a federal-state divide has long 
been recognized as a constitutional imperative.44 It remains so 
even after the fundamental reallocation of state and federal 
power during Reconstruction and once again during the New 
Deal.45 The reservation of constitutional powers to the states—as 
reflected in, among other things, the Court’s recognition of tradi-
tional state police powers46 and its anticommandeering doc-
trine47—attests to an abiding concern for state autonomy. Thus 
the vertical consolidation of federal, state, and local resources 
threatens to chip away at not only state prerogatives and 
democratic preferences but also individual liberty (given the 
 
Railroads, 135 S Ct 1225, 1234–37 (2015) (Alito concurring) (stressing the importance of 
public exercises of State power). 
 41 See William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in 
Jody Freeman and Martha Minow, eds, Government by Contract: Outsourcing and Amer-
ican Democracy 23, 27–32 (Harvard 2009) (emphasizing the long history of “public-
private cooperation” in the United States). 
 42 See Association of American Railroads, 135 S Ct at 1237 (Alito concurring) (as-
serting that delegations to private parties are unconstitutional). 
 43 See generally Michaels, 77 U Chi L Rev 717 (cited in note 14); Michaels, 115 
Colum L Rev 515 (cited in note 3). 
 44 See, for example, Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 351 (Wesleyan 
1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (emphasizing the “double security aris[ing]” from vertical feder-
alism and horizontal separation of powers). See also generally Federalist 28 (Hamilton), in 
The Federalist 176 (cited in note 44) (explaining that national defense powers and respon-
sibilities are divided between the federal government and the states). 
 45 See generally Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations (Belknap 1991) 
(describing the constitutional reallocation of powers during Reconstruction and the New 
Deal).  
 46 See Bond v United States, 134 S Ct 2077, 2086 (2014) (“In our federal system . . . 
[t]he States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good—what we have 
often called a ‘police power.’ The Federal Government, by contrast, has no such authority 
and ‘can exercise only the powers granted to it.’”) (citations omitted). 
 47 See, for example, Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 914–15, 933 (1997). 
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potency of an effectively unified team of federal, state, and local 
officials).48 
3. Intra-agency. 
Third, and admittedly least salient, are the lines of division 
within agencies. To be sure, intra-agency divisions aren’t pro-
vided for in the text of the Constitution. Nor are they historically 
resonant.49 What’s more, some would no doubt insist that such 
divisions are, if anything, constitutionally suspect.50 Neverthe-
less, the rise and legitimization of modern administrative agen-
cies (themselves not textually rooted51) have made these intra-
agency divisions constitutionally significant. 
Elsewhere I contend that administrative agencies, which 
combine previously separated legislative, executive, and judicial 
power all under one roof, initially posed a fundamental threat to 
the tripartite constitutional regime.52 This threat was neutral-
ized, I argue, in large part by the eventual engendering of an 
administrative separation of powers—with the presidentially 
appointed agency heads, the politically insulated career civil 
servants, and the diverse members of civil society (legally au-
thorized to participate meaningfully in administrative matters) 
 
 48 See, for example, New York v United States, 505 US 144, 181 (1992) 
(“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.”); Young, 69 Brooklyn L Rev at 1290 (cited in note 30) (emphasizing the vertical 
separation among government units as protecting liberty because little “can get done 
without the cooperation of multiple actors at multiple levels”); Ann Althouse, The Vigor 
of Anti-commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 Brooklyn L Rev 1231, 1235 (2004) 
(contending that the constitutional safeguard against state commandeering preserves 
liberty particularly in times when national-security powers are apt to be consolidated 
and concentrated); Waxman, 64 Stan L Rev at 297 (cited in note 2) (“Federalism in the 
sphere of national defense offered another safeguard against security-driven tyranny.”). 
 49 See Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, The Federal Civil Service System 
and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change 48, 
51–52 (Chicago 1994) (recognizing that job tenure was not a central component of the 
first wave of civil service initiatives); David E. Lewis and Jennifer L. Selin, Sourcebook of 
United States Executive Agencies *69 (Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Dec 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2HX2-ZN2N (documenting that by the mid-
twentieth century, job-tenured civil servants constituted over 90 percent of the federal 
civilian workforce). 
 50 Although unitary executive theorists focus primarily on presidential control over 
agency leaders, they nevertheless also recognize the incompatibility of, among other things, 
civil service tenure with truly unitary control. See, for example, Steven G. Calabresi and 
Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush 
220–21, 230, 242–43 (Yale 2008). 
 51 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv L Rev 
1231, 1233–49 (1994). 
 52 Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 520–21 (cited in note 3).  
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serving in many respects as apt stand-ins for the three great 
and rivalrous constitutional branches. It was this separation 
within agencies—and this sharing and dividing of power among 
three diverse administrative rivals—that carried forward and 
renewed the constitutional commitment to separating and 
checking State power as that power drifted into the administra-
tive arena.53 
One critical intra-agency line of division exists between the 
politically appointed agency heads and the politically insulated 
civil servants who have the legal authority and often institu-
tional and professional incentive to resist overreaching by the 
political leaders.54 To the extent that line of separation is blurred 
or circumvented (by the reclassification of tenured civil servants 
as at-will employees), efficiencies can likely be achieved. But 
those efficiencies are achieved at a cost: intra-agency consolida-
tion means that there are far fewer obstacles standing in the 
way of hyperpoliticized, immoderate, arbitrary, or unchecked 
exercises of executive power—of the sort that once again place 
administrative power outside of the tripartite constitutional re-
gime that spawned and seemingly valorized it.55 
B. The Aggregate Constitutional Burdens of Consolidation 
Occurring along Two or More Dimensions 
Each of these lines of separation contributes to a State that, 
consistent with our constitutional project, is limited, rivalrous, 
and heterogeneous. The State cannot act too broadly or reach too 
deeply, at least not without significant, voluntary buy-in from a 
diverse set of actors representing distinct institutions, jurisdic-
tions, and constituencies. 
It isn’t immediately apparent that any of this Essay’s dis-
crete examples of national-security consolidation rises to the 
 
 53 See id at 551–52. 
 54 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between Internal and 
External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L J 423, 445 (2009) (“[Civil servants] are com-
mitted to enforcing the governing statutory regime that sets out the parameters of their 
authority and regulatory responsibilities.”); David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential 
Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance 30 (Princeton 2008) 
(“[Civil servants] often feel bound by legal, moral, or professional norms to certain cours-
es of action and these courses of action may be at variance with the president’s agenda.”); 
Harold H. Bruff, Balance of Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative 
State 380–85, 408 (Carolina 2006) (considering civil servants’ respect for legal con-
straints as bolstering “the rule of law”). 
 55 See Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 565–74 (cited in note 3).  
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level of a constitutional violation. But that should not be the end 
of the constitutional inquiry. We still need to think systematical-
ly about the multidimensional nature of consolidation—and the 
seemingly reinforcing effects of consolidation across two or more 
dividing lines. 
Specifically, each of the (for argument’s sake) relatively 
modest federal executive incursions into the private, state, or 
bureaucratic arenas might not amount to much of a burden on 
those co-opted, subsumed, or subordinated institutions or juris-
dictions—nor on those individuals and groups whom separation 
is supposed to protect.56 Furthermore, it might well be the case 
that no singular act of consolidation along one dimension repre-
sents too dangerous of an accretion of federal executive power. 
But widening the lens and taking in the totality of consoli-
dating practices along multiple dimensions reveal how those in-
dividually modest incursions seem to reinforce one another. 
Simply stated, the combined effects of several minor incursions 
might constitute a major one. It is death by a thousand cuts as 
the president and her deputies accumulate power from the pri-
vate sector, from states and localities, and from the previously 
tenured and independent federal bureaucracy. Thus what might 
once have been thought of as discrete instances of tinkering with 
constitutional structure only at the margins now looks like a 
manifold, even systematic (albeit perhaps unwitting and even 
haphazard) attack on the very principles and physical embodi-
ments of separated, checked, and limited constitutional power. 
To help us puzzle through the aggregate constitutional ef-
fects of multiple minor incursions on structural safeguards, we 
can draw on analogous doctrinal inquiries. In cases involving 
constitutional rights and structure, courts have at times consid-
ered aggregate effects, finding the sum total of various measures 
to be unconstitutional notwithstanding the fact that any one of 
those measures would, in isolation, register as constitutionally 
unproblematic. That is to say, in any number of circumstances, 
courts deem one practice, by itself, to raise no constitutional 
concerns unless and until that measure is paired with another 
 
 56 Structure is often valued for the way it protects liberty interests. See, for exam-
ple, New York, 505 US at 181 (recognizing that federalism protects individual liberty); 
Bond v United States, 131 S Ct 2355, 2364 (2011) (“Federalism also protects the liberty 
of all persons within a State.”). 
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(which by itself would likewise raise no concerns).57 Piecing to-
gether these disparate doctrinal inquiries and connecting them 
to this Essay’s instant challenge give us the tools and vocabu-
lary to confront the reconfigured architecture of our multidi-
mensionally consolidated national-security state. 
1. Rights cases. 
Perhaps most notably, some courts in Fourth Amendment 
cases have started to resist the practice of looking at particular 
acts of government surveillance in isolation to “assess[ ] whether 
[a] discrete step at [a] discrete time constitutes a search.”58 In-
stead those courts are considering the totality of surveillance ac-
tivity—that is, whether the sum total of government monitoring 
amounts to a “collective ‘mosaic’ of surveillance” that “can count 
as a collective Fourth Amendment search even though the indi-
vidual steps taken in isolation do not.”59 
What I’m calling an aggregate-effects analysis surfaces in 
election-law contexts as well. There courts have invalidated com-
binations of restrictions or requirements, while recognizing that 
any one of those restrictions or requirements would, by itself, be 
considered constitutionally unproblematic.60 For example, the 
 
 57 See Porat and Posner, 122 Yale L J at 50–53 (cited in note 6) (describing other 
public law contexts where such aggregation might be useful).  
 58 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich L Rev 311, 
314 (2012). 
 59 Id at 313. See, for example, United States v Maynard, 615 F3d 544, 560 (DC Cir 
2010) (recognizing that extensive and persistent surveillance can be unreasonable even if 
any particular instance of such surveillance raises no Fourth Amendment concerns). A 
plurality of the Supreme Court seemed to endorse this mosaic theory in United States v 
Jones, 132 S Ct 945 (2012). See Kerr, 111 Mich L Rev at 313 (cited in note 58) (“The con-
curring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a five-justice majority of 
the Supreme Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.”); Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Surveillance Duration Doesn’t 
Affect Privacy Expectations: An Empirical Test of the Mosaic Theory, 2016 S Ct Rev *8 
(forthcoming), archived at http://perma.cc/4RQD-3QE2 (noting that in Jones, Justice 
Samuel Alito’s “focus on surveillance duration makes the combination of two discrete 
acts that are independently not searches—say, surveillance for one week and surveil-
lance for the next week—a Fourth Amendment search”). 
 Such a mosaic theory has been used, too, by the government in nonconstitutional 
cases. Notable among them are the government’s efforts to resist Freedom of Information 
Act requests in which documents, “some or even all of which are harmless in their own 
right,” can be combined in ways that “convert[ ] the harmless information into something 
useful” to those intent on learning national-security secrets. David E. Pozen, Note, The 
Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale L J 628, 
633 (2005). 
 60 See, for example, Lee v Keith, 463 F3d 763, 765 (7th Cir 2006) (“In combination, 
. . . the early filing deadline, the 10% signature requirement, and the additional statutory 
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Eighth Circuit has held that laws requiring political parties to 
“both conduct and pay for primary elections as a condition of ac-
cess to the general election ballot” were “unconstitutional in 
combination,” notwithstanding the fact that either requirement, 
on its own, would have been permissible.61 
Both the emerging Fourth Amendment case law and the 
election-law doctrines reveal a willingness on the part of the 
courts to think holistically and systematically about regulatory 
regimes, identifying troubling patterns that emerge only by ex-
amining the interplay of two or more dynamic practices, en-
croachments, or impositions. 
2. Structure cases. 
This notion of an aggregate-effects constitutional violation 
seems to apply in matters of structure, too—and that’s especially 
important given this Essay’s focus. Consider Free Enterprise 
Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.62 There 
the Court addressed whether the members of the Public Compa-
ny Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)—an office within the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—could be inde-
pendent of the SEC commissioners, given that the SEC commis-
sioners are themselves independent of the president of the United 
States. Free Enterprise Fund reasoned that one layer of insula-
tion from the president would be constitutionally acceptable. 
But “[t]he added layer . . . makes a difference.”63 That is, the sum 
total of two layers of insulation rendered the SEC/PCAOB struc-
tural design unconstitutional (as it went too far in cabining pres-
idential power).64 Tellingly, when this case was before the DC Cir-
cuit, Judge Brett Kavanaugh likewise focused on the aggregate 
effects of the two distinct layers of insulation. He remarked that 
 
restriction that disqualifies anyone who signs an independent candidate’s nominating 
petition from voting in the primary [ ] operate to unconstitutionally burden the freedom 
of political association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 61 Republican Party of Arkansas v Faulkner County, Arkansas, 49 F3d 1289, 1291 
(8th Cir 1995). See also Douglas NeJaime and Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complic-
ity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L J 2516, 2588 & n 290 
(2015) (emphasizing courts’ heightened concerns with a combination of measures that 
collectively undermine individuals’ “constitutionally protected reproductive rights”). 
 62 561 US 477 (2010). 
 63 Id at 495. 
 64 See id (addressing the aggregate effects of multiple layers of political insulation). 
See also Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan L Rev 1, 18 (2013) (offering 
a broader reading of the Free Enterprise Fund opinion consistent with the possibility that 
the Court might still strike down a single layer of insulation if that layer had “bite”). 
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the scheme being challenged was not “Humphrey’s Executor re-
dux”65—meaning that it was not just another case in which some 
plaintiff was challenging the existence of a single layer of insu-
lation between agency officials and the president (as was the 
case in Humphrey’s Executor v United States66). Rather, Judge 
Kavanaugh viewed the SEC/PCAOB scheme as “Humphrey’s Ex-
ecutor squared”67 because the scheme being challenged involved 
two reinforcing layers of insulation from the president.68 
The Court has also looked to aggregate or collective effects 
when assessing encroachments on judicial powers. In Commodi-
ty Futures Trading Commission v Schor,69 the Court held that 
relatively minor incursions on Article III powers along limited 
lines would be constitutionally permissible.70 In so holding, the 
Court contrasted the decidedly modest adjudicatory responsibili-
ties given to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission with 
the sweepingly broad adjudicatory responsibilities given to non–
Article III bankruptcy judges pursuant to the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 197871—which the Court invalidated in Northern 
Pipeline Construction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co.72 In distin-
guishing essentially minor from major constitutional incursions 
on Article III judges’ authority, Schor emphasized that the 
bankruptcy judges were given “all ordinary powers of district 
courts” and were authorized to “preside over jury trials or issue 
writs of habeas corpus.”73 In all, Schor indicated that the Court 
would look at the sum total of encroachments on Article III 
judges’ powers and decide in at least some instances that the 
 
 65 Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F3d 
667, 686 (DC Cir 2008). 
 66 295 US 602 (1935). 
 67 Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F3d at 686. 
 68 Id at 699 (describing the SEC/PCAOB scheme as one in which there is one inde-
pendent agency “that is appointed by and removable only for cause by another independ-
ent agency”). Note a version of this aggregate-effects test appears to have been used even 
where the Court has considered the constitutionality of only one layer of insulation from 
the president. In Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654 (1988), the Court listed the ways in 
which the independent counsel was effectively insulated from presidential control and 
found that the sum of those discrete forms of insulation did not “impede the President’s 
ability to perform his constitutional duty.” Id at 691. 
 69 478 US 833 (1986). 
 70 Id at 851–53 (explaining that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s “ad-
judicatory powers depart from the traditional agency model in just one respect” and that 
those powers reach into only one particularized area of the law and thus “do[ ] not im-
permissibly intrude on the province of the judiciary”). 
 71 Pub L No 95-598, 92 Stat 2549. 
 72 458 US 50 (1982). See also id at 87; Schor, 478 US at 852–54. 
 73 Schor, 478 US at 853. 
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aggregate effects of those discrete incursions amount to a consti-
tutional violation.74 
* * * 
Of course, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Court (and Judge 
Kavanaugh below) feared too great a dissipation of executive 
power (based on the aggregate effects of minor incursions on 
presidential prerogatives). And in Northern Pipeline and Schor, 
the Court worried about too great a dissipation of judicial power 
(based on the aggregate effects of multiple encroachments on Ar-
ticle III judges’ prerogatives). This Essay, by contrast, focuses on 
the converse concern: potentially too great a concentration of 
federal executive power (based on the aggregate effects of multi-
ple minor incursions on separated and divided power along three 
constitutionally resonant dimensions). 
That said, regardless whether sovereign power is excessive-
ly concentrated or problematically dispersed, the aggregate-
effects analytical approach ought to apply with equal force. In-
deed, this aggregate-effects approach seemingly paves the way 
for future synthetic projects that first carefully study particular 
institutional and policy domains and then assess how much con-
solidation is happening and whether the sum total of consolidating 
forces along multiple axes in that one substantive domain repre-
sents an impermissible affront to constitutional governance.75 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay puts forward two challenges: one sounding in in-
stitutional design and the other in constitutional law. It is my 
hope that future work in the areas of national security and sep-
aration of powers will remain sensitive to the multidimensional 
 
 74 See Wellness International Network, Ltd v Sharif, 135 S Ct 1932, 1944–49 (2015) 
(applying a seemingly similar aggregate-effects analysis and determining that, as in 
Schor, the sum total of alleged incursions on the Article III judiciary did not amount to a 
constitutional violation). 
 75 Whether such challenges can be successfully litigated in the courts is, of course, a 
separate question. It might be difficult for plaintiffs to show injury in national-security 
cases, let alone injuries attributable to multidimensional consolidation per se. For this 
reason, aggregate-effects claims might be better directed to officials in the executive and 
legislative branches with the hope that the political branches take such harms seriously. 
See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212, 1220 (1978) (recognizing that constitutional norms 
should not necessarily be “coterminous with the scope of judicial enforcement” and that 
other institutions besides courts can address “underenforced constitutional norms”). 
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nature of institutional and organizational redesigns, both for 
purposes of making smarter, more careful architectural design 
choices and for purposes of safeguarding our constitutional sys-
tem and its underlying structural commitments. 
